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Abstract 
The purpose of this essay is to analyze the phenomenon of informal payments in 
Greece and introduce a theoretical model for the physicians’ behavior while 
including ethical concern in the physicians’ utility maximization problem. The 
inspiration model of this essay comes from the empirical paper of Thompson and 
Xavier (2002), which introduces informal payments in physicians’ behavior. 
According to that paper, a physician chooses an informal payment in order to solve 
his utility maximization problem. Aiming to the solution of the maximization 
problem, a physician needs to make a choice of the price of the informal payment so 
as to equalize his marginal revenue with marginal cost, hence acting as a monopolist. 
From his choice it is possible to derive a mark-up of the price of the informal 
payment which shows that his behavior is influenced by the choice of the informal 
payments’ price. Following the same structure as in the Thompson and Xavier’s 
paper about the solution of physician’s utility maximization problem, the current 
essay adds an ethical concern factor and derives that physicians’ behavior is 
influenced by giving them a lower power to impose more informal payments in the 
informal market of unofficial payments.  
Key words: ethical concern, informal or unofficial payments, physicians’ behavior, , 
utility maximization 
1. Introduction 
Informal payments have been reported in many countries and can be defined as 
payments that are made outside the official channels of the system. The 
phenomenon exists in many countries worldwide, with percentages that range from 
3 % in Peru to 96% in Pakistan. In Greece the phenomenon is also widely reported by 
quantitative research and social medias’ publications. 
The existence of the phenomenon is attributed to many reasons than can be mainly 
divided into three categories; the legal-ethical factors, the social-cultural factors and 
the economic factors’ category. In addition, the majority of informal payments are 
reported to be given to doctors with subsequent negative effects on equity and 
efficiency (Gaal & McKee, 2005). 
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Furthermore, health care markets can be approached as special markets because 
they do not meet the characteristics of perfect competitive markets. The paradox in 
the Greek health care market is that even though the health market is by itself 
special and mainly public regulated, there is an informal market of unofficial 
payments where the doctors are price setters and have a leading role. The informal 
market is created due to doctors’ behavior to demand informal payments and act in 
an unethical way. 
In particular, when a physician demands an unofficial payment, he is engaged into an 
unethical behavior which is against his duties as given by the law, as well as he takes 
advantage of his relationship with the patient and the state that gives him the 
authority to act as an agent in the provision of health care. According to the Greek 
law about physicians’ medical ethics, it is legitimized that a physician should work in 
an ethical and professional way that does not allow him to discriminate among 
patients, meaning that he cannot provide differential care to those that do not have 
the ability to pay comparing to the people that have the ability to pay (Milionis, 
2012). In this context and accepting that physicians when asking for unofficial 
payments are not obeying the law and have an unethical behavior, a model for 
physician’s behavior in a utility maximization context is described extended with the 
informal payment and ethical concern as components of that behavior.  
The paper is organized as follows: In section two the phenomenon of unofficial 
payments is described and defined with a focus in Greece, in section three the 
description of the Greek health care system is provided in details, in section four 
arguments of health care markets as special markets and the agency problem are 
introduced, in section five the Greek unofficial health care market is described, in 
section six physician’s behavior is modeled with the utility maximization whereas 
adding informal payments and ethical concern, and in section seven conclusions and 
policy proposals are expressed. 
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2. Description and existence of the phenomenon of unofficial payments with a 
focus on Greece 
      2.1 Definition of the unofficial payments  
In the first place, in order to proceed the analysis of phenomenon of informal 
payments it is important to know how this concept is defined. A very good definition 
of informal payments is that ‘’informal payments are payments to individuals or 
institutions in cash or in kind made outside official payment channels for services 
that are meant to be covered by the public health care system’’ (Lewis, 2000, p.v). In 
Greece, apart from the existence of the unofficial channel of the provision of 
informal payments, these are conceived as payments such as additional fees or 
gratitude payments that are given to doctors in order to provide their services that 
are supposed to be free. (Liaropoulos, et al., 2008) 
By looking through the unofficial payments literature someone can find many and 
different names of the phenomenon that refer to the same concept. The variety of 
the names may indicate a possible complexity when looking for different researches 
of the matter. Some synonyms that are used by different researches are ‘’informal 
patient payments’’, ‘’under the table payments’’,’’envelope payments’’, ‘’unofficial 
out-of-pocket payments’’, ‘’under-the-counter payments’’ and ‘’corruption in health 
care’’ (Delcheva et al. 1997; Chawla et al. 1998; Falkingham J. 2005, cited in Stepurko 
et al., 2010). In this essay, to avoid any possible misunderstandings the names 
informal payments and unofficial payments will be used to refer to the same 
concept. 
    2.2 Empirical studies about the worldwide existence of informal payments 
The phenomenon is very common in ‘’former-socialist countries’’ but it has also 
been observed in countries that were not socialist, such as Greece and Turkey 
(Stepurko et al. , 2010, p.9). Several studies pointed out the problem of informal 
payments in different countries such as Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, 
Romania and Tajikistan (Tatar, et al., 2007). Also in Albania it was estimated that 
between 2000 and 2002 around 60% to 87% of Albanian citizens performed an 
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informal payment to doctors in hospitals (Vian et al., 2006).In Russia, Georgia, 
Romania and Poland studies about informal payments reported this phenomenon as 
well. Informal payments had been mentioned in South Asian countries and in Africa 
such as Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Srilanka, Uganda, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
and Ethiopia. Additionally, in South America in Bolivia, as well in China, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgystan informal payments are found. (Thampi GK. 2002; McPake B. et al. 
1999; Lindelow M. 2004; Lievens et al. 2006; Lindelow et al. 2005; Gatti et al. 2003; 
Bloom et al. 2009; Ensor et al.1998; Sari et al. 2000; Gaál et al. 2011; cited in 
Cherecheş et al. 2013).The percentages that come from empirical studies about the 
existence of the phenomenon vary from 3% in Peru to 96% in Pakistan (Lewis M. 
2007; Balanova D. , Mckee M. 2002 ; cited in Cherecheş et al. 2013). 
     2.3 Informal payments in Greece; by whom and where informal payments are 
received 
Informal payments and direct payments for health care which are types of out of 
pocket payments in Greece are counted as one of the largest in Europe Union’s 
countries (Siskou et al., 2008). Cases of informal payments in Greece can be found 
through published articles and few quantitative studies approaching the matter. 
From different publications it can be understood that the amount of informal 
payments is large and is given to doctors (Liaropoulos & Tragakes 1998 ; WHO, 
1996). Doctors in many cases demand the informal payment and it had been 
estimated that 60% of the official and unofficial informal payments are mainly given 
to them (WHO, 1996). The unofficial payment can possibly raise the salary of a 
doctor up to 40 %. It can also be the minor case that many patients offer unofficial 
payments as a gift to doctors. (Konstantoulaki , 2006) 
It is a very usual case that the informal payment is demanded by the doctor from the 
patient in order to perform a surgery that is presented as a health problem that 
should be solved as soon as possible. In the case that a cardiac surgery exists, even 
though there is coverage by the security fund it was found that the patients had to 
pay an additional informal payment (Siskou et al., 2008).Many examples can be 
found to support the insistence of doctors to ask for informal payments in daily press 
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one of which is an example in an everyday newspapers blog with a case of a doctor 
who was caught while asking for the amount of 2000 euros so as to perform a 
surgery in a public hospital. (Parapolitiki, 2013 ; In.gr, 2013) 
The place of their existence is almost everywhere in health care services as it has 
been reported that informal payments exist in private clinics, in public hospitals, in 
polyclinics of a social insurance fund, in a primary care center of National Health 
System, in a private diagnostic center, as well as given to a private doctor or a dentist 
(Fintanidou , 2012) 
2.4 Reasons of the existence of informal payments  
The general reasons for the existence of informal payments are many with some of 
these being the inability of the state to finance the public health care system, as well 
as the unavailability of control systems that can limit the corrupted phenomenon of 
informal payments (Stepurko, et al., 2010).The presence of informal payments may 
also be due to low wages of the medical personnel, the fear of not getting admitted 
for treatment by the side of the patient, and  the case that a patient wants to get a 
better service. Another reason is reported to be the culture to give a present to 
someone as an expression of gratitude (Vian et al., 2006).  
In addition, the reasons of informal payments can be further placed into three main 
categories ; the legal-ethical factors, the social-cultural factors and the economic 
factors’ category. In the first category informal payments exist because the 
physicians accept and demand them, which imply that informal payments are a 
matter of doctors’ low ethics to ask for informal payments. The state from its part is 
not able to control the problem of informal payments because their illegal nature is 
not confirmed by law. In the second category informal payments are engaged into 
the culture of the society to give a gratitude to the doctor and for that reason it is 
very difficult to be changed. As for the last economic category, informal payments 
are attributed to the factor of shortage of the system to provide the services that 
patients demand,  as a result a patient perform an informal payment so as to receive 
the service that he would like to have (Gaal & Mckee  , 2005). 
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In Greece someone pays informal payments to get more rapid access to care and as 
it had been reported that 3 out of 10 citizens who went to public hospitals gave an 
informal payment before the treatment and after the doctor’s demand. (Fintanidou, 
2012)  
From a research that was conducted to 2.741 people, 80% of them reported as the 
main reasons for the performance of unofficial payments to get access in public 
hospitals and to reduce the waiting time. Only the 13.6% of the respondents gave 
informal payments as a gratitude expression (Factorx, 2013). Another research that 
more specifically was made in order to measure the informal payments in Greek 
public hospitals through telephone surveys on 4.738 individuals showed that 42% 
gave informal payments due to the fear that they will get a care with low quality, 
20% gave it because the doctor asked for it and only 18% gave the informal payment 
as an expression of gratitude. Besides, the socioeconomic characteristics did not 
seem to be a factor that affects the size of unofficial payments (Liaropoulos et al., 
2008) 
According to the National Survey for transparency in Greece conducted in 2012 in a 
sample size of 12.104 individuals, 45% of the respondents declared that paid a bribe 
in hospitals, and 16.3% paid the bribe to doctors or to private medical services. It 
was also estimated that 68% of the respondents paid a bribe in the public sector and 
32% in the private sector (Public issue & Transparency International Greece, 2012). It 
is written that even in the years of crisis the phenomenon of informal payments exist 
but the doctors have lowered the payments and they compromise for the amount of 
the received informal payment. In general terms it is possible that an informal 
payment can be up to 5000 Euros and public hospitals are the first in the list of the 
corrupted services in Greece (Kaitanidi, 2010).  
Fitting the reasons of the informal payments of the Greek case; in one of the for 
mentioned categories seems to be a difficult task. The difficulty is attributed to the 
different reasons of existence of informal payments that are mainly related to get 
quicker access to the health care system, the fear to get low quality of service and 
9 
 
the doctors’ demand for informal payments. The impossible placement of informal 
payments in one of these categories shows that the approach of the matter of 
informal payments in Greece can be complex, since without knowing the root of the 
problem it may not be easy to correctly come through the matter and decrease 
informal payments. 
However, whatever the reasons of the informal payments consist of , most 
researches found that the majority of informal payments were given to doctors as 
well as the target of most researches was to explore the informal payments that 
were made to general practioners (Stepurko et al., 2010). Accepting that argument 
of the focus of many researches on doctors who accept the informal payments, 
together with the difficulty to place the reasons of the performance of informal 
payments into a category, it is better to see informal payments as being created 
from the side of the doctors. 
  2.5 Efficiency and equity impacts of informal payments  
In addition, the effects of informal payments cannot be ignored because by their 
possible negative effects it can be understood why informal payments are a 
problem. A tremendous effect of informal payments that had been pointed out is 
the effect on equity and efficiency. The impact on equity largely depends on the way 
informal payments work and this is related to the optional or obligatory type of the 
informal payment. An informal payment can be an expression of gratitude and in this 
case may not affect the allocation of resources and the distribution of services since 
all the individuals can have the health care services that they need irrespectively to 
their ability to provide an informal payment. On the contrast, when the informal 
payment has an obligatory type it can more likely harm the poor who do not have 
the ability to pay and consequently they may be denied to get the health care service 
that they need. In the case of the obligatory type, there is an obvious impact on 
equity since the access to the system is not equal and depends on the paying ability 
of a person, while the needs of the patients are the same. As for the informal 
payments in Greece there is supportive empirical evidence towards the obligatory 
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type of this payment, as it is usually demanded by the physician and as result it is 
undeniable that the informal payments affect equity (Gaal , Mckee   ,2005). 
Moreover, informal payments can cause an impact on efficiency of the health care 
system. The problem on efficiency comes from the fact that the supplied health care 
services are not used by those individuals who are in the position of a serious need 
of their use , consequently the health care services are not utilized by those people 
who would have the highest benefit from the use of such services (Gaal , Mckee   
,2005). 
       3. Description of the Greek health care system  
Further, a detailed description of the Greek health care system is given in order to 
provide the reader with a clear image of how the system works and the further aim 
to understand that the complexity of this system makes it  difficult to find its 
problems, its control and hence its improvement. 
      3.1 A historical review and introduction of NHS 
From 1830, that is the year which characterizes the Greek independence,  until the 
end of the 19th century, a small percentage of the Greek population was covered 
with health care, that being only the 10 % of the working population. The creation of 
the Ministry of Hygiene and Social Welfare occurred only in 1922. Many attempts 
before the establishment of a system with the main aim to cover all the population 
were executed, and the first serious attempt was performed with the creation of 
‘’Social Security Organization (IKA)’’ in 1934. Later in 1941 some public hospitals 
were created for the needs of the war, and in 1960 the creation of social health 
insurance for the public sector workers and the self-employed workers happened. 
The farmers and their families had their social insurance coverage in 1961, with the 
set up of the ‘’Agricultural Insurance Organization (OGA)’’ (WHO, 1996, p.3). 
During the years 1960 to 1970 government’s health care spending was accounted 
only for the 2.5% of the GDP and very few public hospitals were built in big cities . 
With the comeback of democracy in 1974 the great need of reforming the health 
care was a central goal of the new government (WHO, 1996). 
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In 1981 when the socialist party was elected it was in its main political agenda to 
create a health care system that everyone would have access to and in 1983 the 
creation of National Health Care System was established by law. The main principle 
was that the right of entry in health care should not be limited by the financial 
situation of any citizen. During the first years of the establishment from 1983 to 
1988 governmental health care spending increased up to 5% of the GDP. An increase 
in the construction of hospitals and health centers also occurred (WHO, 1996) 
(Mossialos, et al., 2005). 
At the end of 2000 a new health care reform happened with the main goals to 
decentralize the Greek National Health System (ESY), to unify the many different 
social insurance funds, to change the way that public hospitals were administered, to 
put in order the primary health care in urban areas, and generally to improve the 
health of the public and support healthy interventions (Tountas , et al. 2002).  
The decentralization happened by the creation of seventeen regional health systems 
called PESYs (periferiaka sistimata ygeias). Also evening and afternoon changes for 
the doctors in public hospitals were formed together with the system of 
appointments of the patients that included the book of an appointment before 
visiting a doctor instead of waiting in the queue as it was the system before. 
Furthermore, the type of a five year manager administration team was introduced in 
hospitals with the aim that each hospital could have a kind of independence in terms 
of funding. The number of insurance funds was reduced from 39 to 5, therefore the 
creation of a unified health insurance fund that included five insurance funds was 
achieved ( Boutsioli Z., 2010). 
     3.2 The finance of the system and delivery of health care 
The Greek health care system funding is a combination of Bismarck model, which is 
based on insurance finance, and Beveridge model with the financing based on taxes 
and care provided by hospitals, and rural health centers (Siskou et al., 2008). For the 
Greek public health system to work three different ministries have to cooperate; the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance, and the Ministry of 
Finance. The first is in charge of the NHS, the second copes with the insurance funds 
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that are connected with the funding and stipulation of the NHS, and the third 
ministry is responsible for funding the insurance funds and the National Health 
System financial shortages. In fact there are additionally two more ministries that 
contribute to the existence and distribution of the public health care services, and 
these are the Ministry of Education responsible for the number of university places 
in the schools of medicine, and the Ministry of Development that establishes the 
medicines’ prices ( Economou & Giorno , 2009 ; Mossialos, et al., 2005).  Therefore, it 
can be understood that the Greek health care system is mainly financed by taxes and 
social insurance funds. Nonetheless, a private way of funding also exists and has the 
form of official or unofficial payments and in a less extent is composed by private 
insurance (Mossialos, et al., 2005).The supply side of the health care provision is 
attributed to public hospitals and rural health centers, whilst the demand side of the 
health system is based on health insurance funds (Siskou , et al., 2008). 
Nowadays, there is a ‘’tripartite’’ health care provision, with public hospitals, public 
primary health centers that are provided by the NHS. The health care services in 
Greece are categorized into primary care and hospital care (Mossialos, et al., 2005, 
p.S152). Health services are supplied through the public sector through public 
hospitals, ‘’health centers and community medical offices, outpatients’ departments 
of social insurance organizations, municipal dispensaries’’ There is also the private 
provision of health care which is done through ‘’private hospital and clinics, 
diagnostic laboratories, self-employed doctors’’ (Milionis, 2012, p.18). 
   3.3 Doctors’ payment 
After the initiation of the NHS in 1983 physicians could be employed only in public 
sector or only in private practice. Despite the forbid of the private practice many 
physicians were actually working privately against the established law and in some 
cases they asked for informal payments. In this case physicians’ payment mainly 
consisted of a salary (Tountas, et al., 2002 ; Mossialos, et al, 2005). Later in 1992 the 
choice from the side of the physicians of a full time or part time occupation in the 
NHS was allowed, and furthermore permitted them to be privately occupied . In a 
subsequent reform, the problem of informal payments to give bribes to physicians 
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was reported to have risen (Tountas, et al., 2002). It should also be mentioned that 
there is a specific word in the Greek language that characterizes the informal 
payment and that is the word ‘’fakelaki’’, which means a small envelope that usually 
includes the informal payment that is given to physicians or health personnel.  
Nevertheless, towards the decrease of the phenomenon of informal payments, 
evening shifts for the doctors’ practices were introduced, according to which doctors 
could work at the hospitals during the afternoon with the official charge of the 
patients  who perform an out of pocket payments ranging from 25 to 90 Euros . So, 
doctors’ reimbursement was composed of a salary and a fee- for- service type. What 
is more,  there is also the case that the physicians work part time in a social’s 
security fund health center, and also have their private office, thereafter these 
doctors have a ‘’dual activity’’ that gives them a mixed payment. Therefore, one can 
observe a mixed system of reimbursement for physicians based on salary and fee-
for- service (Economou & Giorno, 2009, p.94) (Tountas , et al., 2002). 
4. Health care market as a special market and the agency problem 
In continuing, it is important to provide the health care markets’ characteristics and 
the doctors’ role in that market. By this description it can be understood that doctors 
do not play their role correctly, which is one of the central in this market, thus they 
create an agency problem which gives the health care system a problematic 
function. 
      4.1 Health care market as a special market 
In general, health care markets can be characterized as special markets that are far 
from being perfect competitive since the requirements that exist in a perfect 
competition scheme; the product that is sold is a perfect substitute, the price of the 
product is taken as given, the existence of free entry and exit in the market and 
perfect information by both the suppliers and demanders side, are not met (Frank, 
2008 ). In the health care market, the patient-consumer of a good is not aware of the 
exact quality and quantity of the good that he wants to use since he does not 
possess the required knowledge that would allow him to choose the product of 
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health care that would give him the best health care outcome. In addition, in health 
care markets asymmetric information and search cost exist, together with the 
absence for a market of the risk pertains (Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000).  
Consumers in health care markets are in the position of not knowing what they need 
to use and possess different information from suppliers of health care services such 
as doctors. For that reason there is a relationship that is based on asymmetry of 
information that differentiates the health care market from a perfect competitive 
market where both sides of supply and demand obtain the same information 
(Milionis, 2012). In terms of search cost, a patient needs to search for a physician 
that best matches his preferences, and even when a patient performs that choice, he 
cannot be sure that this choice will give him the best health outcome. Further, in 
order to conceive the absence of the market for the risk in health care market, one 
needs to think illness as a random event that can happen in every person’s life and it 
is a threat for someone’s life, ability to have job, and in general a threat for a 
person’s existence. There is not a market that can sufficiently pay an individual for 
the risk to get sick and it is not possible to have an insurance market that fully 
compensates patients for any possible negative health event that occurs since the 
time of the occurrence of an illness event is not known and totally random (Dranove 
& Satterthwaite, 2000). 
        4.2 Doctors’ role and agency problem 
In the special health care market, doctors’ role is to represent the patient’s needs 
and decide for the patient about the use of health care services. In this sense, the 
relationship between the patient and the doctor can be characterized as a principal- 
agent relationship where the principal is the patient represented by the agent who is 
the doctor. It is possible to expect that doctors do not act as perfect agents, whereas 
a perfect agent is a doctor who has the central aim to maximize the patient’s utility 
by giving him any correct information to the direction of patient’s health 
improvement. A deviation from perfect agency behavior can be referred to the term 
of agency problem and a reason to expect that a doctor might behave as a non 
perfect agent is that doctors' concern for his patients depends on many factors such 
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as ethical concern, net income and possibly prestige (Dionne & Contandriopoulos , 
1985). 
Moving one step forward, it can be conceived that when a doctor demands an 
informal payment, he is engaged into a behavior that puts him far away from acting 
as a perfect agent for the patient, and mainly take advantage of his role. So, the 
agency problem in this case which comes from physician’s behavior to demand for 
informal payments, gives the health system a problematic function with a further 
possible creation of a more special unofficial health care market. 
5. The Greek unofficial health care market, the shape of supply and demand 
5.1 The Greek unofficial health care market 
In the case of Greek health care system the main provider of health is the 
government, the supply and demand is mainly regulated, with the physicians in this 
case being price takers. However, the paradox in the Greek case is that even if the 
government is the main provider of health care and regulates the market, when 
looking more deeply into it; informal payments as being a big part of health care 
provision, the impression of a regulated and public market is not given. The doctors 
play an important role by setting their own prices and from price takers are 
transformed into price setters. So, when it comes to unofficial payments there is an 
informal market and the health care market in this case cannot be described neither 
as perfectly competitive nor as public regulated.  
Consequently, in this case the market that can describe the informal market of 
unofficial payments in a better way is a monopolistically competitive model. In 
particularly, there are characteristics which can support the existence of a 
monopolistically competitive market starting from that the providers of health; that 
being doctors, sell a different product, which is the difference in their ability as the 
patients perceive it. A big number of doctors exist, who give their services which are 
not conceived as perfect substitutes by the patients. The entry and exit of a 
physician in the informal market is easy and has no barriers. The easy entry is being 
implied by the large percentage of informal payments that attracts more doctors to 
get in. There are no barriers of exit, since the nature of this market as being 
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unofficial does not permit the existence of any type of contract that does not allow a 
doctor to be out of the informal market (Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000). 
 
5.2 The shape of supply and demand curve 
The next step for the better understanding of this unofficial market is the form of 
demand and supply. The demand that is faced by each physician has a downward 
slope and is steep with a price elasticity that is close to zero. The steepness of the 
demand curve can be attributed to some reasons, one of which is based on the 
perception of a patient that a purchase of health care good is necessary, thus the 
purchased health care quantity depends on a small extent on the price that patients 
have to pay. Demand’s curve steepness is also explained by the fact that when a 
patient chooses a physician, a patient thinks other factors apart from price and it is 
typical that he is loyal to the physicians from whom he had positive health feedbacks 
before (Dranove & Satterthwaite, 2000).  
Considering simultaneously that a physician sets his price for his services in the 
informal market, thus acting as a monopolist, a positive sloping supply curve cannot 
exist. A physician may provide more or less quantity of treatment depending on his 
choice of informal price and some other factors such as income and ethical concern 
which can affect this behavior, whereas physician’s behavior can further be 
represented by a utility function. 
6. Modeling physicians’ behavior with utility maximization by adding ethical 
concern 
6.1 Key elements for analysis; physician as a utility maximiser 
Physician’s behavior is an important topic in health economics since the physician is 
trained to be the leader in an assuming team of health provision, thinking also that 
without a physician no health care provision could possibly exist. Focusing on the 
informal market of unofficial payments in the Greek case, the theoretical approach 
that is adopted on the matter of physicians’ behavior when they set their prices; that 
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implies that there is no one else that can impose a control on their reimbursement 
and more freedom is given to the physicians to set their prices, is a model which 
assumes that a physician has the highest power and as a monopolist can set his 
prices without being dependent on the prices that other doctors set (Fuchs 1974, 
cited in McGuire ,2000). 
Synoptically, the key elements in order to proceed the analysis are that there is a 
monopolistically competitive market; as described in section 5.1, with physicians 
that are price setters but with the important distinction that physicians are not seen 
as profit maximisers; based on the argument that a physician is not a common 
businessman (McGuire, 2000).  Physicians cannot be seen as common businessmen 
because they should have a concern about the health of their patients and that 
allows them to behave differently from a common businessman and subsequently 
not mainly care about income maximization. Therefore, physicians’ behavior cannot 
be analyzed as a behavior of profit maximizers, but physicians are approached as 
rational individuals who try to maximize their utility. Subsequently, a physician’s 
utility function can include factors such as income and ethical concern and possibly 
prestige. (Dionne & Contandriopoulos, 1985)  
    6.2 Theoretical framework   
In this section, firstly the standard monopoly case is presented with the further 
application of it into the utility maximization problem of a physician. This step is 
important because a monopolist’s problem is connected to profit maximization 
problem and not to a utility maximization problem as in the case of doctors. In the 
second subsection a part of the model from the empirical paper of Thompson and 
Xavier (2002) is presented to show that a physician tries to solve his utility 
maximization problem by choosing the efficient amount of informal payment price. 
In the next section, the problem of a physician to maximize his utility is extended by 
inserting an ethical concern factor in order to see in what extent this contributes to 
the solution of the problem. 
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6.2.1 The standard case 
In a classical monopoly case, a monopolist has some market power and is a price 
setter. In his try to maximize his profit function he faces a constraint of cost and a 
constraint that is connected to consumers’ behavior who pay different prices to buy 
different amounts of commodities (Varian, 1992). Applying the standard case in the 
physician’s behavior maximization problem, an existence of an unofficial health care 
market as described in section 5, gives a physician the power to act as a monopolist 
and being price setter with the purpose to maximize his utility. Physician’s 
maximization problem is formulated as  
Max U = P(Q) Q – C( Q)  (1) 
P : informal price; set by physician 
Q: output or quantity of treatment 
C: cost; function of output or quantity of treatment 
The cost depends on the produced or offered quantity of treatment, thus it is a 
production cost. This cost can for instance include the absence of some material or 
equipment that constrains the physician to supply the desired quantity of treatment. 
Solving the maximization problem by taking the first order condition with respect to 
quantity the following equation is derived (see appendix 1 for calculation) 
     
  
  
  
  
  
     
Looking closer at equation (2) , the left hand side represents the marginal revenue 
(MR) and the right hand side represents the marginal cost (MC). So, equation (2) 
shows that in order to maximize utility a physician needs to offer a quantity of 
treatment so that his marginal revenue equals his marginal cost.  And graphically this 
is what the problem represents: 
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6.2.2 The baseline model 
In the paper of Thompson & Xavier (2002), informal payments were introduced in 
the doctors’ utility maximization problem, and it was further shown that doctors 
chose to offer different quality of care depending on the informal payment that was 
given by patients. The cost which is included in the utility maximization problem 
does not represent a production cost as in the standard case but it is related to a 
sanction cost that the physician faces if he gets caught when asking for an informal 
payment.  
The maximization problem of the physician in this case can be formulated as follows: 
Max U = P Q(P) – C Q(P) (3)  
Solving the maximization problem by taking the first order condition with respect to 
price the following equation is derived (see appendix 2 for calculations): 
     
  
  
    
   
  
     
By comparing equation (2) to (4) it can be seen that these two equations are similar, 
and equation (4) shows that for a physician to maximize his utility he needs to 
choose a price such as his marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
Rearranging equation (4) and performing some algebraic transformations; from 
equation (4) it is derived that  (see appendix 2 for calculation) : 
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where    < 0 and represents the elasticity of demand.  
On the left hand side of equation (5) there is a mark-up and on the right hand side 
the inverse elasticity of demand. The mark-up is the difference between price and 
marginal cost to the price, and the larger this difference gets the larger the mark-up. 
In addition, a mark-up shows the ability of a physician to charge a price higher than 
his marginal cost so as to maximize his utility function, hence a high mark-up implies 
a higher doctor’s ability to charge a price higher than his marginal cost (Perloff , 
2009). 
Furthermore, equation (5) shows that there is inverse relationship between mark-up 
and price demand elasticity; low demand elasticity gives a high mark-up and high 
demand elasticity gives a low mark-up. By the description provided in section 5.2, 
the demand in the informal market has low price elasticity. Therefore, it is more 
likely that the mark-up of the physician is high in the informal market and his ability 
to charge a price higher than marginal cost is increasing as well. As a result in the 
informal market a physician is more able to increase the price of the informal 
payment and further take advantage of his role. It is notable that the ability of an 
individual physician to keep increasing price and have a high mark-up, is limited by 
the market situation1. This implies that there are competitors (other doctors) in the 
market that could possibly charge a lower informal price and attract more patients. 
6.3 A new model; the baseline model with ethical concern 
The model that is used in order to insert ethical concern in the utility maximization 
problem is a combination of the Thompson & Xavier(2002) model and a model 
presented in a review article of Dionne and Contandriopoulos (1985), where ethical 
concern is indicated as a factor in the utility maximization problem of the physician. 
In the paper of Dionne and Contandriopoulos (1985) the prestige factor is included 
as a variable of maximizing doctor’s utility but prestige is excluded from the 
following presented model mainly because its component of index of hospitals’ 
                                                          
1
  market situation means that the informal market is monopolistically competitive 
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quality cannot be measured, since neither measures about doctors’ performance nor 
measures about quality indexes of the hospitals exist in the Greek health care 
system. In reality, these measurements are concepts far from the current situation 
when looking at the health care sector in Greece.2 
The doctor maximizes his utility with the constraints of income and ethical concern. 
The problem can be formalized such that the physician tries to maximize his utility  
Max U=U (Y, E) (6)  
 Y= income 
 E=ethical concern 
 Ux>0, Uxx<0  
 x=Y, E  
There is an exchange between the variables of income and ethical concern which 
means that a doctor might decrease his ethical concern in order to increase his 
income. The positive marginal utility that is given by Ux>0 shows that there is a 
positive relationship between utility and income, and utility and ethical concern. The 
negative second partial derivative of utility (Uxx<0) implies that there is a point for 
each of the factors of income, and ethical concern that gives the physician the 
highest level of utility (Dionne & Contandriopoulos, 1985). 
Further, one should look at the constraints of the maximization problem so as to 
realize and understand in a better way the nature of the problem; meaning that 
there are factors behind the main determinants of the utility function that affect 
utility with one way or another . First there is the income constraint  
Y=Y fixed + Yinformal (7). 
 The Yfixed is the income that includes the type of reimbursement that the physician 
gain in the formal market and can have either the form of salary or the fee-for-
                                                          
2
 The prestige factor gives some policy implications that being discussed in the last section of the 
essay 
22 
 
service type of reimbursement. For simplicity of the analysis it is assumed that this 
income is fixed and exogenously determined, because the physician cannot directly 
influence that or at least he cannot influence this income at the same way that he 
can with informal payment income. The Yinformal needs to be determined as  
Yinformal=P Q(P)- C Q(P) (8) 
 P : price of informal payment 
 Q: output or quantity of treatment  
 C: cost 
The cost in this model is similarly defined as in Thompson & Xavier empirical paper 
where a sanction cost is connected to the probability that a physician will be caught 
when asking for an informal payment. 
Another constraint is the ethical concern constraint, which can be formulated as a 
negative relationship of the price of the informal payment; and as a positive 
relationship of doctor’s accuracy about truthtelling. Accuracy can be conceived as 
the case when a physician plays the correct role in the principal agent relationship, 
being a perfect agent and not act for his interest. The more accurate the doctor is of 
saying the truth to a patient, the more the ethical concern of the doctor, and the 
higher the doctor’s utility. It is noteworthy that the accuracy variable is possible to 
include some other variables, for instance an attitude variable that affects the 
behavior of the individual to act according to social norms and being a good doctor 
that only cares for the better health of the patients3. So, ethical concern is formally  
E=E(P, A) (9) ;  
  
  
   and 
  
  
   
A: accuracy of the doctor about truthtelling 
                                                          
3
 Some policy implications connected with a possible attitude variable are discussed in the last section 
of this essay 
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The utility function of the physician is additive when taking into account the 
constraints (8) and (9) and the utility maximization problem is solved with respect to 
informal price.  
Max U= P Q (P) – C Q (P) + E ( P, A ) (10) 
In continuing, the physician maximizes this utility function under the price of 
informal payment and solving the problem by taking the first order condition with 
respect to the informal price the following solution comes up (see appendix 3 for 
calculations) : 
     
  
  
    
   
  
 
  
  
       ; where   
  
  
  4 , 
  
  
    
Comparing equation (11) with equation (4) , it is obvious that there is a similar result 
but extended with the partial derivative of ethical concern, which means that in this 
case the marginal cost is greater. However, for the solution of the utility 
maximization problem it is required that the marginal revenue should be equal to 
the marginal cost, and taking that marginal cost is higher; as shown in equation (11) 
when inserting ethical concern in the maximization problem, it is implied that 
marginal revenue should increase and this involves a lower price. More clearly, when 
looking at the left hand side of equation (11) for the marginal revenue to increase, 
quantity must increase, and by assumption the price negatively affects quantity, so 
quantity can increase if price decreases. The other factor with affects the marginal 
revenue is the partial derivative of price on quantity which is assumed to be 
negative, by the shape of the demand curve and requires that a decrease in price will 
give an increase in quantity and a subsequent increase in marginal revenue.  
By applying some algebraic transformations in equation (11), (see appendix 3 for 
calculations) it gives 
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
  
 (12) 
                                                          
4
  It is derived from the assumption that price elasticity of demand is negative, which implies that 
there is a negative relationship between price and quantity 
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On the left hand side of this equation there is a mark-up and by comparing equation 
(12) with equation (5), it is obvious that the mark-up is now getting smaller. The 
reason for that is because the mark-up decreases with price demand elasticity at the 
same manner as in equation (5); a low demand elasticity gives a high mark-up and a 
high demand elasticity gives a low mark-up, but it also decreases by a second factor. 
Looking at the extra factor, the fraction 
  
   
  
  
  by itself gives a positive effect but that 
becomes negative5 in the equation (12). 
In subsection 6.2.2 it was concluded that it is more likely to have a high mark-up, 
hence a high ability of an individual doctor to charge higher prices. His ability can be 
restricted by the structure of the market that allows the existence of many doctors 
who can charge lower prices and attract more patients. In addition, with equation 
(12) it is implied that this ability is further restricted because the mark-up becomes 
smaller.  Ethical concern plays a role in that restriction as seen from the fraction  
  
   
  
since it gives an individual physician a lower mark-up, a lower ability to charge a 
higher price for an informal payment. Actually, by looking at equation (11); as argued 
previously, it is better for the individual doctor to decrease the price of the informal 
payment so as to maximize his utility.  
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
The models presented and discussed above strongly show that informal payments 
affect physicians’ behavior because they contribute to the solution of the utility 
maximization problem of the physician. From Thompson & Xavier model it can be 
concluded that informal payments give physicians an ability to charge prices that are 
higher than the marginal cost and that ability is inversely related to price demand 
elasticity. Since an individual physician faces a downward steep demand curve with 
low demand elasticity in the informal market due to the necessity of the commodity 
of healthcare, it is likely that physician’s ability is high. However, physician’s ability to 
                                                          
5
 Positive because it is assumed that   
  
   
   and 
  
  
 <0  and then negative because of the 
minus sign in front of this part   
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keep increasing the informal price is restricted by the market of informal payments 
which is monopolistically competitive and allows the existence of other doctors who 
offer health care services that are not perfect substitutes. In this sense there are 
competitors; the other doctors who can charge a lower price and attract more 
patients. 
In addition, when the model of Thompson and Xavier (2002) is extended by inserting 
the ethical concern factor in the utility maximization problem the physician 
continues to have a high ability to charge larger prices than the marginal cost                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
due to low demand elasticity . Nevertheless the addition of ethical concern 
constraint lowers the power6 of the physician. Physicians’ power gets smaller, 
because the mark-up gets smaller as it does not only inversely depend on price 
demand elasticity but additionally depends on the marginal effect of the price of the 
informal payment on ethical concern and the marginal effect of the price of informal 
payments on quantity of treatment. It is therefore obvious to conclude that the 
ethical concern factor plays a role in the utility maximization problem and more 
focus should be made to improve that factor so as to affect doctors’ behavior in the 
direction of not asking any informal payment. 
The ethical concern factor can be influenced in different ways and this should be 
understood by looking at the ethical concern constraint more deeply. 
By looking more closely to equation (9) the ethical concern can be influenced by 
increasing the variable of accuracy. The accuracy variable seems to contain an 
attitude variable that makes an individual doctor to act correctly so as to be a good 
doctor that cares for patients’ better health. The attitude variable can be influenced 
during the university education period of a doctor which implies that more courses 
during the medical study period could be introduced. A good designed and sufficient 
number of ethical courses during the medical university education would teach 
medical students that an ethical attitude or behavior in their future profession is 
very important. In particularly, in countries where the unofficial payments are 
strongly established in the health care system; one of which being Greece, more 
                                                          
6
 The term power is the ability of the individual physician to charge a price higher than marginal cost 
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medical ethics courses should exist. By having a special focus in ethical part during 
the education period future doctors will have a high level of ethical concern when 
they get into the medical profession, which will make them not to ask for informal 
payments. 
Additionally to the ethical concern that can be influenced, more policy implications 
can be derived in order to decrease the phenomenon of informal payments in 
Greece and in other countries that suffer from that. Governments should have 
stronger control mechanisms in addition to the illegality of the action of accepting 
informal payments. Stronger mechanisms imply serious punishments for those 
doctors that take informal payments (Tatar ,et al., 2007). For instance, a serious 
punishment can be related by calling the action of accepting informal payments a 
criminal action, and sentence the criminal–doctor to the prison.   
Moreover, a state must try to have a system that is in general more transparent, 
which implies that if a patient comes across the behavior of a doctor that demanded 
an informal payment, this patient should be able to report the doctor’s action 
without any fear ( Ensor T., 2004 ; Vian et al., 2006). Therefore, the existence of an 
official state organization, where patients can complain and report doctors’ behavior 
of asking informal payments is vital to exist. By having an official organization for 
patients’ complaint not only the informal payments can be decreased but it can also 
be easily known that informal payments are generally unaccepted and illegal. In 
order to make the formentioned organization known it is important that a 
government has a good advertising plan, for example by using social media and have 
advertising campaigns in places such as hospitals. 
Furthermore, a prestige factor as Dionne & Contandriopoulos argue in their paper is 
possible to affect physicians’ utility maximization problem. However, in the new 
constructed model with the ethical constraint, the prestige constraint was decided 
not to be included because the part of quality index does not exist in the Greek 
health care market. Since it is likely that quality indexes affect prestige and prestige 
affects doctors’ behavior, it would be a good idea to insert quality indexes into the 
Greek health care system so as to measure and evaluate doctors’ performance. The 
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establishment of quality indexes is possible to give incentives to doctors to work 
more and increase their offered quantity of treatment, since their performance will 
be in a sense monitored. It is more likely that doctors would mainly focus on 
increasing their quantity and quality of treatment and have a high quality index and 
as a result they will not care to ask or induce informal prices. The quality indexes 
when established should further be connected to doctors’ reimbursement so as the 
higher the quality index the higher the reimbursement. 
Lastly, the empirical application of the model with the ethical concern factor can be 
an interesting and open topic for further research. Nevertheless, one should also 
consider that there are limitations for empirical application with models that include 
informal payments in general because it is very hard to find people that want to 
openly talk for that matter, which makes the data collection a complex task.  
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8. Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Max U = P(Q) Q – C( Q)  (1) 
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 = 0 
     
  
  
  
  
  
     ; which shows that MR=MC 
where MR =      
  
  
  & MC = 
  
    
 
Appendix 2 
Max U = P Q(P) – C Q(P) (3)  
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Algebraic calculation from equation (4) to equation (5) 
Note that εd = 
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Appendix 3  
Max U= P Q (P) – C Q (P) + E ( P, A ) (10) 
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Algebraic calculation from (11) to (12) 
Rearrange equation (11) 
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